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ABSTRACT 
The role of power within regional firm networks is noted in empirical studies but 
insufficiently theorized.    We suggest that network functioning is conflictual and that 
more powerful network members, particularly transnational corporations (TNCs), 
leverage regional resources to advance their sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
The agendas and power exercised by TNCs within regionalized firm networks have 
significant implications for regional policy and the uneven allocation of resources and 
capacities within and among regions.  
 
Our findings indicate that transnational firm access to resources critical to innovation, 
including university research and skilled labor, negatively affects the potential for 












R11 - Analysis of Regional Growth, Development, and Changes 
R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity 
R3 - Production Analysis and Firm Location 
R58 - Regional Development Policy 
 
 1 
CHARTS   
Figure 1: Rochester Photonics Survey: Top Industries for Photonics SMEs 
Figure 2: Rochester Photonics Survey: Location of Customers and Suppliers of SMEs 
Figure 3: Rochester Photonics Survey: Customers of SMEs 
Figure 4: Rochester Photonics Survey: Why do firms stay in Rochester? 
Figure 5: Rochester Photonics Survey: What do firms need? 
 2 
Research on how firms actually behave in territorial innovation systems has raised 
questions about some taken-for-granted premises in policy-oriented regional development 
studies (Diez & Kiese, 2006; Hendry & Brown, 2006; Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005; 
Malmberg & Power, 2005; Martin & Sunley, 2001).  One taken–for-granted premise is 
that co-located transnational and small and medium-size firms exist in a cooperative 
relationship that enables the small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) to introduce 
innovations and reach global markets. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) and Dicken (1998) 
describe how the assumed symbiotic relationship between large and small firms is rooted 
in the “lead agent” role played by transnational corporations (TNCs). Within this 
theoretical frame, TNCs locate in regional innovation systems to tap the specialized 
innovative capacity of small firms. In return, because they have more favorable access to 
capital and information, TNCs enable regionalized SMEs to access innovation -relevant 
information and reduce risk in volatile financial markets. 
Kristensen and Zeitlin’s (2005) case study of a transnational firm and its 
relationships with its regional subsidiaries in several countries, suggests that this potential 
is not reached. Instead, association with the TNC network “led to the creation of 
volatility, destruction of skills, loss of strategic assets, and additional needs for liquid 
capital, while very few of the potential benefits seemed to have been achieved” (p.7).  
They attribute this failure to the “diversity of evolutionary logics” that emerge as 
transnational firms expand (p.17) and to the consequent constraints on the ability of the 
TNC to tap the specialized knowledge of regional innovation systems, to absorb 
knowledge from global markets, and to transfer that knowledge to local firm networks.  
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While acknowledging the importance of this account of the capabilities of TNCs 
as lead firms, we focus on another factor that limits innovative capacity in regional 
economies that include innovative small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and “lead” 
TNCs.  This factor is TNC power relative to regionalized SMEs.  It is manifested in TNC 
ability to use its political power to manage access to and the orientation of key regional 
production resources.  The goal of this strategy is to maintain TNC sustainable 
competitive advantage in global markets and attain profit goals.  Our research on 
regionalized innovative SMEs in “advanced” manufacturing, combined with evidence 
from other recent case studies of regional innovation systems, indicates three ways in 
which TNC power can affect innovative capacity.   
First, TNCs use political power to influence regulatory policy, affecting which 
innovations are commercialized and how knowledge is diffused, to whom, and under 
what conditions.  Second, TNCs drive the innovation agenda within publicly supported 
research centers, including those at universities.  Finally, TNCs dominate the regional 
labor market, using management resources to organize skill development programs 
around their specific needs, and competing with SMEs for the most valued segment of 
the skilled workforce – experienced technically-trained workers who combine technical 
and managerial skills.   Since the TNC agenda diverges from and competes with that of 
innovative small firms, it can limit or even squelch SME ability to reach their innovative 
potential. 
  A closer look at power in territorial firm networks provides a different vision of 
how TNC-led regional innovation systems function. In particular, a power-oriented 
analysis begins to answer questions about why  regionally co-located firms do not 
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produce market-disrupting innovations or lead  to unique regional competencies  and 
regional competitive advantage (Asheim & Coenen, 2006; Moulaert & Sekia, 2003; 
Simmie, 2005). More generally this type of analysis can contribute to a broad set of 
theoretical debates concerned with the role of power in processes with spatial and 
territorial dimensions (Allen, 2003, 2004). 
To set the stage for looking at how TNCs exercise network power by leveraging 
regional resources, we briefly examine current thinking about the role of small firms in 
the innovation process and at the theories about why co-location should be associated 
with innovation.  
 
The Missing Questions of Power and Conflict in Innovative Networks 
Regional programs to develop sustainable innovation-based economies typically 
emphasize the role that small entrepreneurial firms (SMEs) play in the innovative 
capacity of regions. (Acs et al., 1994; Audretsch & Feldman, 2003). The idea that small 
firms contribute to the innovative capacity of regions is a compelling one given empirical 
evidence that small firms “innovate” with greater alacrity than large firms (Hicks & 
Hegde, 2005).  Measures such as patent activity, for example, establish a crucial role for 
small firms in the potential commercialization of new products.  
 The ability of small entrepreneurial firms to produce path breaking products and 
processes also has been linked to their participation in networks of interacting firms 
(Feldman et al., 2005) .  Case studies of regional innovation systems have focused on the 
importance of trust and cooperation in networks and the ways in which positive social 
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relations produce information sharing and knowledge spillovers, the critical factors 
underpinning sustainable innovation economies (Cooke, 2004, 2005).  
This cooperation promotes a rapid and flexible response to changing and 
expanding global markets, and the capacity for innovation.  Cooperation among co-
located firms enables knowledge spillover from the learning and practice of firms in the 
co-located network.  Knowledge spillover and the “untraded interdependencies” (Storper, 
1997) produced via a cooperative network essentially make the whole greater than the 
sum of its parts and lead to a sustainable regional innovation system (Funke & Niebuhr, 
2005). The second attribute is a skilled labor force, which is critical to both innovative 
capacity and the diffusion of knowledge within and across firms (Christopherson & 
Clark, 2007b; Malmberg & Power, 2005).  
 Within the policy literature, transnational corporations (TNCs) play a particular 
and fairly limited role in regional innovation systems. As “lead firms” they connect their 
fellow network members to global markets, enabling them to expand and specialize 
(Porter, 1998). TNCs seek competitive advantage by entering specialized regional 
industries in order to draw on their innovative capacities and benefit from their skilled 
labor (Cooke, 2004).  The combination of small firm flexibility and innovative capacity, 
with large firm access to global markets theoretically enables regions to escape the 
dominant logic of convergence and price-based (or as it is sometimes called) “low road” 
competition.  
Empirical studies have found, however, that trust or cooperation among co-
located firms  is  limited (Angel, 2002; Freel & Harrison, 2006; Glasmeier, 1991; Hendry 
et al., 2000; Lorenzen & Mahnke, 2002).  Rather, there is  evidence that, even under the 
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most favorable conditions, the relationships among co-located firms, and particularly 
those in supplier networks, are “close but adversarial” (Mudambi & Helper, 1998). One 
account describes “subversive” strategies in which the small innovative firm purposefully 
uses TNC resources but distances itself from the TNC because of the costs of integration 
into and dependence on the TNC agenda (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005).  Together these 
accounts suggest a competing paradigm, one in which relations within innovation-based 
regional economies are infused with conflicts of interest and power relations. 
Evidence to the contrary, the question of power relations has been missing from 
theories attempting to explain change in regional agglomeration economies and firm 
networks or failures in entrepreneurship and innovative capacity. To the extent it is 
recognized, the limits to regional innovative capacity have been explained with reference 
to endogenous characteristics of the region, such as inadequate supportive institutions or 
technological or political “lock-in” (Todtling & Trippl, 2005).  These approaches, 
although providing significant insights, leave a model of cooperation and trust among 
large and small firms as the dominant paradigm. In its lack of attention to power 
relations, and emphasis on trust relations and “soft infrastructure”, the literature on 
regions and firm networks is afflicted  by some of the same theoretical problems as those 
which afflict the concept of social capital (DeFilippis, 2001; A. Markusen, 1999).   
DeFilippis (2001) notes in his critique of social capital that networks of all kinds, 
(presumably including firm networks), are constructed around relative power relations. 
Networks encompass hierarchies of power or they wouldn’t be networks. As Lin  points 
out in an analysis of networks and individual investment in social capital, some positions 
in a network carry more valued resources and provide options for the exercise of greater 
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power (Lin et al., 2001).  There would be no incentive for the more powerful members to 
remain in the network if they didn’t disproportionately gain the benefits of network 
participation. Just as people “network” in order to promote their individual interests 
(rather than those of the network as a whole), so do firms. Networks can and frequently 
do take the form of hierarchies with marginal benefit to the less powerful members.  With 
respect to firm networks, regional firm clusters are important to the TNC only insofar as 
they support the international competitiveness of the TNC. 
A second important characteristic of networks is their exclusivity. There is no 
purpose in belonging to a network if it does not keep people or firms outside its 
boundaries. In this instance, too, the rewards of exclusivity disproportionately go to the 
more powerful members of the network who can control who is in and who is out.  
One demonstration of how power is used to set network boundaries is in the 
naming and identification of firm networks. For example, the choice to define a network 
as a biotechnology network rather than a pharmaceuticals or medical devices network 
prioritizes technology as the defining characteristic rather than end products.   The 
“technology choice” makes the market goals and orientation of the network less visible 
and supports the background conception that change in markets is primarily driven by 
changes in technology rather than firm choices.  
The observation that networks involve power is not a wholesale rejection of the 
role and importance of a regional social infrastructure. The idea that informal rules and 
norms aid coordination of economic actors under conditions of uncertainty is borne out 
by numerous empirical studies. Also unproblematic is the idea that this social 
infrastructure and its informal rules are differentiated by region, and function in 
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regionally specific ways. Again, comparisons among regionalized industries in the same 
nation, demonstrate considerable difference in industrial cultures across regions (A. 
Markusen, 1987; Saxenian, 1994). 
What is missing from contemporary regional theory is an account of how the 
agendas of TNCs and SMEs can result in competition rather than cooperation and how 
TNCs have the upper hand in shaping the innovative potential of many regional 
innovation systems. In the next section we examine how research that refutes wholly 
cooperative conceptions of regional innovation systems explains sources of conflict. 
 
SOURCES OF CONFLICT: TRAJECTORIES, CONTINGENCIES, AND GOVERNANCE IN 
INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
The basic policy framework for regional innovation systems has stayed 
remarkably consistent over time.  Michael Piore outlined an institutional framework for 
regional innovation in 1990 and that framework has been reiterated in subsequent 
research (Amin, 1999; Scott, 1992, 1998; Sengenberger et al., 1990; Storper, 2002): 
Thus far, the literature seems basically to have identified a list of 
factors which are critical to success. The standard lists include: 1) a 
major research university, 2) an academic tradition, or ethos, which 
encourages researchers to engage in practical activities and which 
is not hostile to linkage between the academic and business 
community, 3) venture capital or, more precisely, a local financial 
community with both the resources and the willingness to provide 
funds for start-up enterprises; and 4) a local entrepreneurial 
tradition and a reservoir of expertise on the management of start-up 
business. The attempts to create new [high tech] regions have 
essentially tried to create the institutions on the list (Piore, 1990: 
299). 
 
Despite consistency in what constitute the key elements of success, concerns about the 
functioning of regional innovation systems have been a persistent part of the literature.  A 
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series of case studies have raised questions about whether successful regional innovation 
systems can be sustained over time (Gertler, 2003). Among these case studies are a set 
which examines the trajectories of firm networks in the industrial districts that inspired 
the first work on regional innovation and its distinct advantages in global markets 
(Bianchi, 1994; Crevoisier, 1999; Sabel, 1983).  These studies found evidence of 
deterioration in the innovative capacity of   previously innovative firm networks.  
According to Boschma and Lambooy, “evidence suggests that in many industrial districts 
in Italy, there is a tendency for more market concentration (both horizontally and 
vertically), more market power (embodied by leader firms and business groups), fewer 
local inter-firm relationships (especially in the case of suppliers and subcontractors), less 
inter-active and inter-organizational learning, and some signs of institutional lock-in.” 
(Boschma & Lambooy, 2002). 
Two types of explanations are advanced for the failure of small firms in regional 
innovation systems to produce and commercialize new products. The first explanation 
attributes failure to the characteristics of the small firms and their interaction with one 
another.  The second set of explanations takes a more dynamic  (and trans-local) 
approach, examining how  regional production systems built around small firms are 
affected by the changing agendas of lead firms in global production networks. 
In the first, pattern-oriented, framework, the failed potential of small firm 
networks embedded in regional innovation systems has been noted by analysts of what 
are described as “entrepreneurial” regions. The “entrepreneurial regionalists” suggest that 
what prevents small firms from innovating is the absence of an entrepreneurial ethos, 
defined as the willingness to take risks in pursuit of big gains, and the ability to develop, 
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commodify, and commercialize the outputs of applied research (Audretsch, 2004).  They 
attribute the absence of this ethos to market and governance failures that prevent 
cooperative competition among small firms and inhibit knowledge spillovers. 
 By contrast, there are a set of case studies whose questions and findings are 
underpinned by theories of firm and global production network path dependency.  
Regional innovation systems are affected by policy frameworks and economic conditions 
(in financial markets, for example) which change from one round of accumulation to the 
next (Massey, 1984). This dynamic orientation links these case studies of regional 
innovation systems to previous case studies of industry evolution and change 
(Christopherson & Storper, 1989; Dicken, 1988; Glasmeier, 1991, 2000; Markusen, 
1985; Stone, 1973). They position questions about regional innovation systems within a 
theoretical tradition in economic geography that examines firms strategies in response to 
changing market conditions and government policies, in addition to new technologies. 
Within this theoretical frame are studies of regional innovation systems emerging 
in old industrial regions. These studies have pointed to the contradictory processes 
affecting these regions by virtue of their connections to global markets through TNCs 
(Dawley, 2007f). These firms may be just as likely to be “removing resources from the 
region via rationalization and restructuring” as initiating new growth dynamics 
(Benneworth, 2006). For example, recent studies of the auto industry have recognized 
limits to innovation by small and medium size firms co-located with lead firms in the 
industry (Belzowski et al., 2003; Rutherford & Holmes, 2006). These studies, too, focus 
on change over time and the way in which asymmetries in firm power and differential 
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access to global production and distribution networks affect the innovative potential of 
firm networks.  
A basic premise of this approach is that hierarchy and power in regional 
innovation systems are affected by the changing role and market power of the TNC as it 
responds to market incentives.  This power can be exercised in various ways, including in 
governance institutions and information diffusion -- “leader-firms and other organizations 
have sometimes become too dominant in the local institutional network” (Boschma and 
Lambooy, 2002: 302). A concern with power in inter-firm relations is a considerable 
departure from the conventional literature, which has tended to emphasize trust and 
cooperation  and to imply, at least tacitly, symmetrical relations among firms (Asheim, 
1992; Asheim & Isaksen, 2002) . 
Finally, the “contrarian” case studies differ from the mainstream literature in how 
they understand governance relative to network functioning and innovative capacity. The 
mainstream research on entrepreneurial innovative regional economies has emphasized 
the ways in which regional institutions provide the glue that underpins trust and 
cooperation in firm networks.   By extension, the case studies that identify the failures of 
regional innovation networks tend to tie those failures to the governance of the regional 
firm network and particularly the relationships among the small innovative firms.  The 
failures are attributed either to lack of cooperation among innovative small firms or to 
industry specific dynamics that alter relations between large and small firms (Grabher, 
1993; Rutherford & Holmes, 2006).  
By contrast, the “contrarian” case studies suggest that the normative model of 
cooperative trust relations may, in fact, be the exception and that conflicts and power 
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relations are common in inter-firm networks.  Our research adds a third dimension to the 
contrarian picture --- that of territorial governance and particularly sources of conflict 
over inputs critical to the innovation system.  Another possible explanation for innovative 
firm network failure, then, is that the unequal power relations and the different strategic 
agendas of small innovative firms and dominant “flagship” TNCs hinder cooperation, 
foster information asymmetries, and reduce innovative potential. 
Following on these insights, we examine how small innovative firms and 
transnational corporations use territorially–based governance institutions to leverage 
regional assets. In the conventional picture, large firms and SMEs appear to operate in 
parallel universes---the TNC in global markets and the SME in the region. At the same 
time their interests converge in the arena of innovation, where they play complementary 
roles (Scott, 1992).  In reality, the universes of innovative SMEs and TNCs intersect at 
the scale of the region where they both rely on regional resources to achieve strategic 
objectives.  TNCs and SMEs, however, have considerably different objectives with 
respect to the content and direction of the innovation process (Harrison, 1994; Storper & 
Harrison, 1991; Warrian & Mulhern, 2005). These differences are magnified if the TNC 
is publicly traded and subject to pressure for short term gains (Pike, 2005) . So, for 
example, the need for large markets combined with goals of double-digit percent annual 
growth in earnings per share prompt TNCs to focus on new products with large potential 
growth in the short term (West & DeCastro, 2001). And since the ultimate goal of 
publicly traded TNCs is  the achievement of sustainable competitive advantage rather 
than innovation per se,  its managers need to control the innovation process so that it 
complements their interests (Ernst et al., 2005).   
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 Holmes and Rutherford describe how knowledge production and diffusion may 
be affected by the TNC agenda: 
Knowledge development within and between firms within North 
American automotive OEM supply chains is being shaped mainly by a 
short term focus on price reduction and the OEMS control of intellectual 
property.  OEM demands for continuous price reductions from suppliers 
have cascaded down the supply chain and adversely impacted the 
automotive tooling manufacturers who sit at the bottom of the supplier 
base. 
 Rutherford and Holmes (2006: 23). 
They cite a case study of the automotive industry supply chain on the impact of short 
term goals of TNCS, (Belkowski et. al. 2002), who  find that “suppliers believe that they 
transfer more knowledge to larger customers than they receive and too many firms are 
being forced to focus on short-term cost cutting, at the expense of knowledge-focused 
production.”  (Rutherford and Holmes 2006: 22). 
 In our research on innovation systems in U.S. regions, we also find that large 
firms that dominate local factor markets and global product markets, (TNCs), have 
different access to resources critical to innovation than do small and medium-size firms 
(SMEs) in regional agglomerations noted for their innovative potential.  Our explanation, 
while recognizing the importance of differences in industry and firm paths, focuses on 
TNC power relative to governance institutions. Because of their influence over labor 
markets, government policy, and research and development institutions, the needs of 
large firms tend to take precedence over those of small firms.  
In the next sections we present research on the photonics industry in Rochester 
that sheds light on the differing roles and goals of TNCs and small innovative firms in 




DIFFERENT AGENDAS IN A FIRM NETWORK: PHOTONICS IN ROCHESTER 
Since the early 1900’s, the Rochester, New York region has been the home of 
large, transnational corporations in two inter-related industries: optics and imaging and 
photographic equipment and supplies.  The large firms in the region are prominent 
household names, including Kodak, Xerox, Corning, and Bausch and Lomb. All have 
restructured their operations since the 1980s to position themselves in global markets and 
utilize global production networks.  For much of the workforce, this restructuring  meant 
the end of a century of job security, and of a predictable employment system organized 
around internal labor markets (Jacoby, 1997; McKelvey, 1956)  
The Rochester photographic equipment and optics and imaging industries have 
been organized historically around specialized suppliers.  Even before the restructuring  
that accelerated in the in the 1980’s, the industries  in Rochester included a large number 
of small and medium sized firms, which were tied together through buyer and supplier 
relations with each other and  the large firms in the region.  In some cases, regionally-
based suppliers were connected to a global network of optics and imaging end product  
producers (Sternberg, 1992). Since the 1990s, the regional network of small and medium 
sized firms has identified itself by technology---photonics---rather than by the traditional 
end products of the industry---optical, imaging, and photographic equipment.  This 
identification with a shared technology rather than a shared end market illuminates the 
role the small and medium sized firms play in the transnational supply chain (Figure 1). 
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The Rochester region has remained competitive in optics, imaging, and photonics, 
but the contemporary industry has shifted its priorities to enter and develop products for 
new markets (Jacobs, 2002). While Rochester’s large “lead” firms continue to 
concentrate on optics and imaging, consumer, and office products, the smaller firms have 
focused on photonics technologies and a wide array of intermediate markets.  
 The lead firms, most notably Kodak, are at the peak of global production 
networks producing new products, such as digital cameras, for mass markets.  While the 
Rochester region is no longer the production center for Kodak, the company has 
maintained its research and development activities in the region.  The innovative small 
and medium sized “photonics” firms supply the lead firms but also compete with them in 
the research and development phase of production.  So, by contrast with the literature on 
global production networks, which portrays lead firms as playing a supportive role to 
regionalized innovative SMEs the small innovative Rochester photonics firms are in 
direct competition with the lead  firms for key inputs, including specialized labor, 
research and development resources, and information on intellectual property. . These 
inputs are, to a large extent, provided by regional institutions, such as The University of 
Rochester and Rochester Institute of Technology or the product of long-term investments 
in industry specific skills and science-based knowledge.  
In researching the regional industry between 2001 and 2004, we conducted a 
survey of small and medium size photonics firms in order to better understand their 
specific characteristics and their relationships with each other, lead firms located in the 
region (Kodak, Bausch and Lomb, Xerox, Corning); global production networks, and 
regional institutional resources. Our survey questions emerged from a series of focus 
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groups and key informant interviews with l actors engaged in the Rochester optics and 
imaging industry. The focus groups included representatives from firms, universities, 
civic organizations, trade associations, labor unions, community-based organizations, and 
public sector agencies.     The survey questions were designed to examine how firms in 
the industry cooperate and interact with each other in the context of rapidly changing and 
technologically challenging markets. 
The telephone survey was conducted during July and August of 2002.  Of the 90 
firms constituting the population of optics, imaging, and photonics firms, 57 responded 
fully to the survey as administered, a 63 percent response rate for the survey. Among the 
57 firms responding, 51.2 percent of the firm representatives interviewed characterized 
themselves as the owner, CEO, or president of the firm. The firms were primarily small 
manufacturing firms (74 percent of respondents) with 76 percent employing between 1 
and 50 people and none with more than 500 employees.   
The survey results indicated that the small innovative photonics firms in the 
region remained connected to the lead firms and their global production networks. 
Seventy-four percent of firms responding had a past or existing subcontractor or supplier 
relationship with one or more of the four transnational firms in the region.  The photonics 
SMEs reported that 59 percent had a present subcontractor/supplier relationship with the 
“Big Four.”  In a question aimed at the labor market for industry-specific skills, 42 
percent of firms reported that a former or current staff member had previously worked for 
Corning, Kodak, Bausch and Lomb, or Xerox. 
Because of the diverse applications of the photonics technology, however, the 
SMEs also supply widely diversified intermediate markets (Figure 2). Although they 
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identified themselves as manufacturing firms, they generally did not manufacture end 
products themselves but rather supplied optical, imaging, or photonics components to 
other firms.  
The survey responses indicated that while most of the small firms were part of a 
regional supply chain---that is, they interacted with one another---their customers were 
distributed internationally (Figure 3). Rochester’s optics, imaging, and photonics firms 
serve diverse markets including precision optics, calibration and measuring equipment, 
medical devices and biotechnology applications, and military and security devices. One 
firm owner described photonics as an “enabling industry,” one that serves product 
markets based on the wide applicability of the underlying technology.   
 Interviews and focus groups indicated differences in the markets in which small 
and medium sized firms and lead firms operate.  While both operate in global markets, 
the large lead firms are oriented toward end product markets while innovative SMEs 
serve intermediate input markets. Lead firms and SMEs are, however, in direct 
competition in input factor markets for skilled labor and research and development 
capacities within regions. 
  This competition in regional markets for labor and research and development 
resources places small and large firms in an adversarial position.  Both types of firms 
need the same, regionally-embedded, factors of production.  Many of these factors are 
publicly regulated or subsidized. The political and economic power of large firms, vis a 
vis, the state strongly influences public priorities regarding the allocation and use of these 
resources.   In so far as the small and large firms share the same priorities (and there are 
situations in which they do) there is no disparate impact.  However, empirical evidence 
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from the Rochester case and others, demonstrates that small and large firm interests 
diverge in some key respects and that the small innovative firm agenda and needs are 
likely to take second place to those of the large lead firm.  
 
COMPETITION OVER KEY RESOURCES:  SKILLED LABOR  
One factor that is taken for granted in the regional innovation literature is the 
critical role of highly skilled labor with training in science and engineering. Our research 
indicates, however, that, because they are engaged in product commercialization and 
prototype construction as well as research, innovative SMEs need a labor force with  a 
wide range of skills. In our survey, photonics firms in Rochester were asked two 
questions that related to the importance of labor skills: 1) what role did labor skills play 
in their decision to remain in the region, and 2) what resources were important to their 
ability to grow and expand in the region. The firm survey respondents identified the 
quality of the labor supply as the second most important reason for their presence in the 
Rochester region (Figure 5). In response to the second question the highest ranked answer 
was medium-skilled labor (Figure 6). In interviews, these medium-skilled workers 
included those with several years of experience and the ability to combine technical and 
managerial skills. 
The answer to the second question is, perhaps, more telling than the first, which is 
consonant with evidence on the centrality of labor skills in regions oriented toward high 
value-added production. Although science and engineering workers are regularly 
considered a locational asset in attracting and retaining firms, the labor market needs of 
innovative industries  include workers with a range of skill levels (Florida, 2002a, 2002b; 
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Gertler & Wolfe, 2002).  In the Rochester regional labor market, however, SMEs find 
themselves in direct competition with transnational firms for medium skilled workers. 
This problem was consistently voiced in interviews with the CEOs of SMEs and with the 
public officials in the Industrial Development Association, charged with assisting the 
expanding group of innovative photonics firms. During the early period of our research, 
the supply of medium-skilled labor, particularly experienced operatives with machining 
skills, was extremely limited. In part, this resulted from the power of large firms in 
setting the prevailing wage in the region.  Prospective employees looking at the 
Rochester region would decide against moving there because wages were consistently 
below the national average for their skills (Clark, 2004; Pendall at al, 2004). Our 
interviews indicated that TNCs actively lobbied public officials to prevent the entry into 
the labor market of competitor transnational firms that would raise the prevailing wage 
rate by competing for medium-skilled workers.   When inward investment by other lead 
firms does occur, it serves to drive up wages for the experienced medium-skilled worker.  
For example, a 2007 study of advanced manufacturing in the near-by 
Binghamton, New York city-region, based on interviews and focus groups with managers 
from SMEs and TNC lead firms suggested what can happen in more competitive 
conditions. Wages in the highly competitive computer and electronic sector rose almost 
12 percent between 2000 and 2005 while wages in non-manufacturing sector in the 
region declined 4 percent during the same period (Christopherson et al., 2007). In both 
regions, however, small firms are disadvantaged in the competition for medium skilled 
workers. In the Binghamton region, small specialized firms in the electronics packaging 
industry compete for experienced technically skilled workers with transnational 
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aerospace firms, Lockheed Martin and BAE, which have major facilities in the 
Binghamton region.  One small software firm manager described the imbalance: 
We tried to advertise, and it was a disaster.  Lockheed Martin has 
so swamped the local paper that your little ad doesn’t even get 
seen.  National ads yielded completely inappropriate resumes; we 
got zero interviews out of it.  We do better talking with people we 
know. 
 
In both the Rochester and Binghamton regions (and perhaps unexpectedly), 
competition is not as severe at the high end of the skill spectrum. Small innovative firms 
attract entrepreneurial skilled labor because they offer the alternative compensation that 
makes them competitive with corporate employment (e.g. stock options, co-ownership, 
leadership positions) and more opportunities for satisfying creative engineering work. 
High-skilled workers for the TNCs tend to follow firm contracts as they move from one 
location to another. Nineteen percent of the workforce in the two fastest growing 
Binghamton advanced manufacturing sectors migrated into the region to work (Ibid.). 
The ability of the regional labor market to meet the needs of innovative SMEs is 
also affected in some U.S. states, including New York, by what are popularly called 
“non-compete agreements”. Where they are enforced, non-compete agreements, between 
an employer and an employee regulate the movement of skilled workers among firms 
within a given geographic area and industry (Kauffman, 2007). 
These state-level regulations prevent skilled workers from moving among firms or 
establishing new enterprises in their area of expertise.  
TNCs essentially operate in a global labor market, able to attract engineers and 
scientists from all over the world, and thus could provide the regional skill base for 
technological innovation in existing and new firms. Instead, covenants not to compete 
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protect the recruitment and training investment of TNCs by limiting the mobility of 
workers. In places, such as the state of California where non-compete agreements are not 
enforced, entrepreneurship and innovation were encouraged by  a free flow of skilled 
labor in the market (Gilson, 1999; Saxenian, 1994; Stone, 2004). 
 
COMPETITION OVER KEY RESOURCES: RESEARCH CAPACITY 
Our research in Rochester also pointed to another source of inequality and 
asymmetry between large TNCs and innovative SMEs: access to research infrastructure 
(Christopherson & Clark, 2007a). Again, there are differences in the objectives of TNCs 
and small potentially innovative firms within a regional innovation system. For example, 
TNCs want research institutes supported by universities or public funds to take on 
specific tasks in the development process. Because they cannot directly control 
university-sponsored research, they prefer that universities focus on generic technology, 
giving the TNC direction as to what research avenues are likely to be more profitable. 
They can then rely on in-house or captured research institutes to do the research that will 
result in commercial products and processes (Ernst et al., 2005).  Increasingly those 
“captured research institutes” have emerged as partially publicly financed innovation 
centers or, as they are called in New York State, “Centers of Excellence” (Feller, 1999). 
Transnational corporations are interested in “embedded labs” in part because they 
provide access to the emerging entrepreneurs and their ideas after a technology has been 
developed but before they spin off into competitors.  In a related case, research on the 
implications of the innovation center agenda in the field of biotechnology indicates that 
spin-offs to SMEs are rare and that commercialization is limited to those products of 
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interest to large transnational firms, such as those in pharmaceuticals (Kenney & Patton, 
2005). The large firm buyers are frequently not located in the region of the innovation 
center so investment in innovation doesn’t contribute to the development of a dynamic 
regional agglomeration. In the context of the goals of these centers, small innovative 
firms are a means to an end, rather than a resource whose potential contributions to 
regional innovation need to be fostered. 
TNCs are opposed to “the over involvement of universities in downstream 
product development activities” as a consequence of their mission to increase a capital 
flow from equity holdings in start-up firms and patents and licensing agreements (Feller, 
1999).  Small firms, however, lack the in-house commercialization capacity and need 
assistance in converting generic research into commercial properties (Ibid: 15). Since 
universities are critical venues for such support, TNC support for university research can 
serve to limit research focused on downstream applications that benefit smaller firms. 
 The way in which research is conducted in state-supported “innovation centers”   
represents another example of how power inequalities affect access to resources that 
foster innovation. is In the U.S., many states, along with their federal partners, have 
invested significant economic development resources in these industry or technology -
specific centers aimed at research, training, and commercialization.  A stated goal of 
these centers is to promote regional innovation capacity by nurturing nascent 
entrepreneurs (Bozeman, 2000).  
Innovation center agendas are developed around explicit partnerships among 
universities, large firms, and state and local government, but heavily weighted toward the 
needs of the TNC “lead” firms.  In the cases we have examined, the centers are managed 
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by staff seconded to the innovation center from transnational firms in the region and their 
advisory boards are dominated by large firm representatives. In order to benefit from the 
resources of the center, small innovative firms must be willing to compromise their 
independence and control of their intellectual property, allowing the large firms to learn 
about their innovative activities. The flow of information tends to be upward to the lead 
firm rather than diffused or horizontal, in ways that could benefit small firms. 
 The 2006 composition of the Board of Directors for the New York Infotonics 
Center of Excellence provides some insights into the differences in power and influence 
of transnational corporations and SMEs over regional innovation assets, including 
valuable information.  The Infotonics Center lists 10 Board members, 7 of whom 
currently work for Kodak, Corning, or Xerox.  The Board is rounded out by two directors 
of university research centers and one small firm representative. The CEO is a Kodak 
retiree.  While innovation centers have become popular sites for regional economic 
development investment, their governance remains dominated by large corporate 
interests, calling into question their role in encouraging small firm growth and innovative 
capacity.  
Far from fostering a regional entrepreneurial ethos, these centers provide 
opportunities for large firms to observe their (potential) small firm rivals. In some cases, 
large firms negotiate a “right of first refusal” for innovations developed under the 
center’s umbrella as a condition of their participation.  These deals undercut the role 




CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
Because of their size, scale, and political as well as economic power, TNCs can 
shape the governance environment within which they operate at the regional, national and 
international scale. While TNC influence is well-documented, it is often portrayed as a 
result of individual influence rather than a systematic aspect of market governance. 
 As already noted, TNCs want to decrease the risk of disruptive innovations, 
prevent competitors from entering their product markets, and build innovations around 
the standard which they have established so as to add value to their product line and 
brand identity. To achieve these goals TNCs have to carefully manage the regional 
innovation process.  This management may mitigate against rather than in favor of 
innovations that could lead to regional economic development.  
 Although research touts the advantages of small firms to the economy and job 
growth, evidence (from the US, at least) tells us that small firms are marginal players in 
the policy arena---at any scale.  Their needs are poorly understood and the government 
programs intended to foster small firm innovation are minuscule when compared with 
subsidies and assistance to large firms (Feldman & Desrochers, 2003; Feldman et al., 
2002).  
Theoretically, this shouldn’t be a problem if the entrepreneurial activity of small 
firms is a spillover or by-product of industry agglomeration (Scott & Storper, 2003). 
Policies benefiting large firms in the agglomeration should not negatively impact small 
firms or their capacity for innovation. In fact, if it creates more capacity in the entire 
network of firms, there should be benefits to a large firm presence. 
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A look at real life policy making and how it engages and affects small and large 
firms in regional agglomerations presents a more complicated picture. First, it suggests 
that the interests, capacities, and strategies of large, transnational firms and SMEs in the 
same industry are considerably different from each other and may, in fact, conflict. 
Second, the power of the large transnational firm to set the innovation agenda and to 
insure that public policy supports that agenda is manifestly apparent.  Large firms 
producing and distributing in international markets are able to influence policy because, 
despite down-sizing and out-sourcing, they continue to be major employers. They also 
have the resources to hire lobbyists, promote policy research, and contribute to officer 
holders who will give priority to their needs. Small firms, on the other hand, have little 
influence on policy because they lack political resources and influence. 
With respect to the labor market, a key component of a dynamic regional 
innovation-oriented economy, the agendas of large firms and small firms diverge. Large 
firms shape the instructional programs of colleges and universities and have a 
disproportionate influence on prevailing wage rates for key personnel. Small firms in a 
growth phase may be starved of necessary workers both because of their inability to 
compete with the large firm for skilled labor and because they can’t single-handedly 
attract skilled workers to come into the region. Although partnerships with universities 
may provide small firms with access to highly skilled workers in the development phase, 
this kind of support does not accommodate growth and production. When it comes to a 
critical segment of experienced, technically-skilled workers, small firms compete with 
TNCs, which offer not only higher wages but better health benefits, a key ingredient in 
the U.S. context because of the absence of national health protections.  
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 Divergent interests are also evident in the territorial strategies of small and large 
firms. For example, large firms are eager to promote inter-regional competition because 
they hold significant regional investments and want to drive down costs. They are 
intrinsically more sensitive to sunk costs than small firms. Large firms are also more 
interested in replicating and embedding redundancies in their production networks both 
within and across regions. Small firms, by contrast, are more invested in the efficiencies 
and capacities of their own region.  
 These divergent interests are often glossed over in the presentation of a “regional 
vision” and a strategic plan for innovation-led development. In fact, the interests of the 
large firms may be used to represent the interests of the region as a whole (Lovering, 
1999; MacLeod, 1996).  What is perhaps more ironic is the large transnational firm 
agenda may, in fact, undermine the goals of policy-makers genuinely engaged in building 
innovative regions. The goal of regional innovation is a dynamic set of firms producing 
more jobs and opportunities.  The goal of the TNC, by contrast, is to control any 
innovation not compatible with the firm’s interests in sustainable competitive advantage. 
Certainly, TNCs have no incentive to promote the growth of small firms into regional 
producers and competitors who will challenge them for skilled labor and drive up the cost 
of other inputs.  
            From our perspective, market concentration, failure to cooperate, and knowledge 
asymmetry all indicate a power differential among firms and lead to another explanatory 
framework for failure and success in regional innovation systems..  While evidence 
indicates that skilled labor, coupled with institutional research and development 
capacities are  central  to successful regional innovation systems (Malmberg & Power, 
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2005),  the power asymmetry between small and large firms means that TNC lead firms 
dominate in both realms, potentially undercutting regional innovative capacity.   The 
remedy is policies that genuinely target small, innovative firms and recognize the current 
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Markets of Photonics Firms in Rochester   Percent of Firms 
Imaging and Reproduction 19% 
Other (aerospace, all of the above, etc...) 16% 
Semiconductor 13% 
Scientific Instruments 11% 
Defense 11% 
Telecommunications Equipment 11% 
Medical Devices 8% 
Consumer Products 6% 
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